What's good about welfare-experiencing entities existing, rupie?
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From: Rupert on 3 Sep 2008 13:38 On Sep 4, 12:53 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > "Good", as an ethical value statement, is entirely a human notion. > Humans may not be able to give fully philosophically coherent > explanations for what they mean by good, but they can give some sense to > it. If someone who likes ice cream says that it is "good" if you give > him a cup of ice cream, when before he had none, you know what he means: > he likes the outcome. You have a sense of your own welfare, and you > might even like ice cream yourself, so you know *exactly* what he means > when he says it is a good outcome to get a cup of ice cream. You can > argue all you like about whether or not an increase in his satisfaction > *ought* to be considered good or not, but you have no further questions > about what he *means* when he says his satisfaction has increased, and > that he, at least, considers that outcome to be good. It is a primitive > concept, but you intuitively get it. > > Not so with your claim that it is "good" for such an individual to exist > in the first place. THAT use of "good" is entirely empty of meaning, at > this point, and based on your complete incompetence in these matters, > will remain devoid of meaning. You can't make even a tiny bit of > progress in saying what's good about it. Saying "The outcome is good" is not the same thing as saying "I like the outcome". When individuals come into existence and have pleasant experiences, they like that, too.
From: Rupert on 6 Sep 2008 05:13 On Sep 4, 2:40 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > Rupert wrote: > > On Sep 4, 12:53 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > >> "Good", as an ethical value statement, is entirely a human notion. > >> Humans may not be able to give fully philosophically coherent > >> explanations for what they mean by good, but they can give some sense to > >> it. If someone who likes ice cream says that it is "good" if you give > >> him a cup of ice cream, when before he had none, you know what he means: > >> he likes the outcome. You have a sense of your own welfare, and you > >> might even like ice cream yourself, so you know *exactly* what he means > >> when he says it is a good outcome to get a cup of ice cream. You can > >> argue all you like about whether or not an increase in his satisfaction > >> *ought* to be considered good or not, but you have no further questions > >> about what he *means* when he says his satisfaction has increased, and > >> that he, at least, considers that outcome to be good. It is a primitive > >> concept, but you intuitively get it. > > >> Not so with your claim that it is "good" for such an individual to exist > >> in the first place. THAT use of "good" is entirely empty of meaning, at > >> this point, and based on your complete incompetence in these matters, > >> will remain devoid of meaning. You can't make even a tiny bit of > >> progress in saying what's good about it. > > > Saying "The outcome is good" is not the same thing as saying "I like > > the outcome". > > In the example I gave, it is. > > > > > When individuals come into existence and have pleasant experiences, > > they like that, too. > > Right. But that's not the issue. > > The issue is, what's "good" apart from their liking it? In the example of the cup of ice-cream, what's good apart from the person liking it? > You're saying > there is something good about it. What is it? You surely must have > /some/ sense of what it is that's being measured, and it is *NOT* the > number of welfare-experiencing entities; that is the outcome itself. > What's good about the outcome, rupie? You seem to have some sort of problem with saying "It's good, other things equal, if more sentient beings come into existence and live lives that are on the whole worth living." You want me to give an explanation of what's good about it. I'm telling you it can't be done. Explanations have to run out somewhere. Why is it good if someone enjoys a cup of ice cream?
From: Dutch on 6 Sep 2008 06:33 Rupert wrote: > On Sep 4, 2:40 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: >> Rupert wrote: >>> On Sep 4, 12:53 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: >>>> "Good", as an ethical value statement, is entirely a human notion. >>>> Humans may not be able to give fully philosophically coherent >>>> explanations for what they mean by good, but they can give some sense to >>>> it. If someone who likes ice cream says that it is "good" if you give >>>> him a cup of ice cream, when before he had none, you know what he means: >>>> he likes the outcome. You have a sense of your own welfare, and you >>>> might even like ice cream yourself, so you know *exactly* what he means >>>> when he says it is a good outcome to get a cup of ice cream. You can >>>> argue all you like about whether or not an increase in his satisfaction >>>> *ought* to be considered good or not, but you have no further questions >>>> about what he *means* when he says his satisfaction has increased, and >>>> that he, at least, considers that outcome to be good. It is a primitive >>>> concept, but you intuitively get it. >>>> Not so with your claim that it is "good" for such an individual to exist >>>> in the first place. THAT use of "good" is entirely empty of meaning, at >>>> this point, and based on your complete incompetence in these matters, >>>> will remain devoid of meaning. You can't make even a tiny bit of >>>> progress in saying what's good about it. >>> Saying "The outcome is good" is not the same thing as saying "I like >>> the outcome". >> In the example I gave, it is. >> >> >> >>> When individuals come into existence and have pleasant experiences, >>> they like that, too. >> Right. But that's not the issue. >> >> The issue is, what's "good" apart from their liking it? > > In the example of the cup of ice-cream, what's good apart from the > person liking it? > >> You're saying >> there is something good about it. What is it? You surely must have >> /some/ sense of what it is that's being measured, and it is *NOT* the >> number of welfare-experiencing entities; that is the outcome itself. >> What's good about the outcome, rupie? > > You seem to have some sort of problem with saying "It's good, other > things equal, if more sentient beings come into existence and live > lives that are on the whole worth living." You want me to give an > explanation of what's good about it. I'm telling you it can't be done. > Explanations have to run out somewhere. Why is it good if someone > enjoys a cup of ice cream? Ice cream is good "for them" (context) because it gives them pleasure, which *they* value. (Ice cream. per se, is not good or bad). Note, they must first exist before *they* can have preferences and welfare states. Therefore it is wrong to say that existing per se is better than not existing, "for them", (not existing is meaningless) therefore in order for the statement to make sense one must find another context, which you haven't done. Therefore the answer is simple, its not better, unless you postulate some spiritual sub-context for all life, or something of that nature.
From: Rupert on 6 Sep 2008 21:07 On Sep 6, 6:33 pm, Dutch <n...(a)email.com> wrote: > Rupert wrote: > > On Sep 4, 2:40 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > >> Rupert wrote: > >>> On Sep 4, 12:53 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > >>>> "Good", as an ethical value statement, is entirely a human notion. > >>>> Humans may not be able to give fully philosophically coherent > >>>> explanations for what they mean by good, but they can give some sense to > >>>> it. If someone who likes ice cream says that it is "good" if you give > >>>> him a cup of ice cream, when before he had none, you know what he means: > >>>> he likes the outcome. You have a sense of your own welfare, and you > >>>> might even like ice cream yourself, so you know *exactly* what he means > >>>> when he says it is a good outcome to get a cup of ice cream. You can > >>>> argue all you like about whether or not an increase in his satisfaction > >>>> *ought* to be considered good or not, but you have no further questions > >>>> about what he *means* when he says his satisfaction has increased, and > >>>> that he, at least, considers that outcome to be good. It is a primitive > >>>> concept, but you intuitively get it. > >>>> Not so with your claim that it is "good" for such an individual to exist > >>>> in the first place. THAT use of "good" is entirely empty of meaning, at > >>>> this point, and based on your complete incompetence in these matters, > >>>> will remain devoid of meaning. You can't make even a tiny bit of > >>>> progress in saying what's good about it. > >>> Saying "The outcome is good" is not the same thing as saying "I like > >>> the outcome". > >> In the example I gave, it is. > > >>> When individuals come into existence and have pleasant experiences, > >>> they like that, too. > >> Right. But that's not the issue. > > >> The issue is, what's "good" apart from their liking it? > > > In the example of the cup of ice-cream, what's good apart from the > > person liking it? > > >> You're saying > >> there is something good about it. What is it? You surely must have > >> /some/ sense of what it is that's being measured, and it is *NOT* the > >> number of welfare-experiencing entities; that is the outcome itself. > >> What's good about the outcome, rupie? > > > You seem to have some sort of problem with saying "It's good, other > > things equal, if more sentient beings come into existence and live > > lives that are on the whole worth living." You want me to give an > > explanation of what's good about it. I'm telling you it can't be done. > > Explanations have to run out somewhere. Why is it good if someone > > enjoys a cup of ice cream? > > Ice cream is good "for them" (context) because it > gives them pleasure, which *they* value. (Ice cream. > per se, is not good or bad). Note, they must first > exist before *they* can have preferences and welfare > states. Therefore it is wrong to say that existing per > se is better than not existing, "for them", (not > existing is meaningless) therefore in order for the > statement to make sense one must find another context, > which you haven't done. Therefore the answer is > simple, its not better, unless you postulate some > spiritual sub-context for all life, or something of > that nature. Well, you're assuming that any judgement about what is "better" has to be in some context. Henry Sidgwick talks about "the point of view of the universe"; I've got a feeling you're not going to be especially impressed by that and plenty of other people have criticised it too. Nevertheless the idea that we can talk about outcomes being "better" or "worse", as opposed to better or worse for any specific individual, is not completely crazy. I don't see that you've shown it to be wrong.
From: Rupert on 6 Sep 2008 21:12
On Sep 7, 12:25 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > Dutch wrote: > > Rupert wrote: > >> On Sep 4, 2:40 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > >>> Rupert wrote: > >>>> On Sep 4, 12:53 am, Rudy Canoza <pi...(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote: > >>>>> "Good", as an ethical value statement, is entirely a human notion. > >>>>> Humans may not be able to give fully philosophically coherent > >>>>> explanations for what they mean by good, but they can give some > >>>>> sense to > >>>>> it. If someone who likes ice cream says that it is "good" if you give > >>>>> him a cup of ice cream, when before he had none, you know what he > >>>>> means: > >>>>> he likes the outcome. You have a sense of your own welfare, and you > >>>>> might even like ice cream yourself, so you know *exactly* what he > >>>>> means > >>>>> when he says it is a good outcome to get a cup of ice cream. You can > >>>>> argue all you like about whether or not an increase in his > >>>>> satisfaction > >>>>> *ought* to be considered good or not, but you have no further > >>>>> questions > >>>>> about what he *means* when he says his satisfaction has increased, and > >>>>> that he, at least, considers that outcome to be good. It is a > >>>>> primitive > >>>>> concept, but you intuitively get it. > >>>>> Not so with your claim that it is "good" for such an individual to > >>>>> exist > >>>>> in the first place. THAT use of "good" is entirely empty of > >>>>> meaning, at > >>>>> this point, and based on your complete incompetence in these matters, > >>>>> will remain devoid of meaning. You can't make even a tiny bit of > >>>>> progress in saying what's good about it. > >>>> Saying "The outcome is good" is not the same thing as saying "I like > >>>> the outcome". > >>> In the example I gave, it is. > > >>>> When individuals come into existence and have pleasant experiences, > >>>> they like that, too. > >>> Right. But that's not the issue. > > >>> The issue is, what's "good" apart from their liking it? > > >> In the example of the cup of ice-cream, what's good apart from the > >> person liking it? > > >>> You're saying > >>> there is something good about it. What is it? You surely must have > >>> /some/ sense of what it is that's being measured, and it is *NOT* the > >>> number of welfare-experiencing entities; that is the outcome itself. > >>> What's good about the outcome, rupie? > > >> You seem to have some sort of problem with saying "It's good, other > >> things equal, if more sentient beings come into existence and live > >> lives that are on the whole worth living." You want me to give an > >> explanation of what's good about it. I'm telling you it can't be done. > >> Explanations have to run out somewhere. Why is it good if someone > >> enjoys a cup of ice cream? > > > Ice cream is good "for them" (context) because it gives them pleasure, > > which *they* value. > > This is where the explanations run out, as rupie terms it, but note that > it's *much* farther along than in his subject-less situation. We > stipulate that it's "good" when someone's preferences are met - for his > satisfaction to increase - because we are familiar with it ourselves, we > think of it as "good" for our own satisfaction to increase, so it's not > much of a stretch to think of someone else's satisfaction increasing as > "good". We have some innate notion of favorable outcomes - "good" > outcomes - based on an innate notion that greater satisfaction of > preferences is "good". But *note*: there is *always* a subject for > *whom* it is good in these innate notions. That's why these notions > intuitively make sense. > > In rupie's subject-less scenario, there's no sense to "good" at all. I > actually suspect that if you delved deeply enough into the professional > literature on this, you'd eventually find /some/ subject of the > "goodness". Obviously a wikipedia entry on axiology isn't going to be > exhaustive, but it did at least point out a distinction between > intrinsic and instrumental goodness. One example it pointed to, albeit > somewhat vaguely, was natural habitat preservation. That is considered > "just good", even though no person might actually benefit from it. What > I feel is vague about it is that, even if no humans directly benefit > from natural habitat preservation, quite obviously some animals do. > > In the end, notions of goodness *always* have some kind of subject in > mind, even if it's only a hypothetical subject. That's why I'm always > careful to add "...or what" when I ask who is the subject: "for whom or > what" is something good? > > When you get down to it, rupie's position really /does/ become the same > as Fuckwit's. Ultimately, rupie is saying that existing and having a > happy life is good for the animals themselves. He's desperately trying > not to go there, clinging to his bankrupt idea of intrinsic goodness, > but as I said, I think even the pros ultimately get around to having > subjects for whom (or what) the thing is seen as good. > > > (Ice cream. per se, is not good or bad). Note, they > > must first exist before *they* can have preferences and welfare states. > > Therefore it is wrong to say that existing per se is better than not > > existing, "for them", (not existing is meaningless) therefore in order > > for the statement to make sense one must find another context, which you > > haven't done. Therefore the answer is simple, its not better, unless you > > postulate some spiritual sub-context for all life, or something of that > > nature. I don't really feel that you are that much further along because you can specify a subject for whom it is good, I don't really see that as all that big a deal. Sure, we will explore the literature on axiology and see what is said about the matter, but basically I don't see the problem with a notion of intrinsic goodness. It seems to me to be a fairly intuitive idea that pleasure has intrinsic goodness as well as instrumental goodness. But anyway, you are probably right that this point is debated in the literature on axiology, so we will have a look and see what is said about the matter. And perhaps I will change my mind. But I'm not especially impressed by what you guys are saying, you're basically just saying without argument that in order for an outcome to be better it must be better for some individual. You might hold that view, yes, but you might also hold a contrary view and I've yet to see that you people have offered reasons for thinking that your view is better. |