From: Mr.Smartypants on

"Rudy Canoza" <pipes(a)thedismalscience.noot> wrote in message
news:fsGdnfvxL7TtE-7VnZ2dnUVZ_hqdnZ2d(a)earthlink.com...
> Rupert wrote:
>> Gosh, it's quiet in here.
>>
>> I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
>> inconsistent.
>
> Stupid clown.



Translation: I didn't understand any of it.........but I think he used some
words that are not real words.



From: Dutch on
Rupert wrote:
> Gosh, it's quiet in here.
>
> I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
> inconsistent.
>
> (1) For each moral agent M, if M believes that a set of individuals S
> has a moral right against a set of moral
> agents T that the agents in T not act in a certain way, and if M can
> avoid being financially complicit in the
> set of agents T acting in that way, or in any other comparable moral
> wrong, while accepting a burden no greater
> than that incurred by a typical citizen of an affluent nation by
> becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
> electricity, and M is knowingly financially complicit in the set of
> agents T acting in that way, then M is a moral
> bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite.

Comparing war with farming is an attempt to cloud the issue. The rights
people normally hold *are* subverted in a wartime situation. By all the
usually acceptable codes of conduct war violates the rights of everybody
involved.

Stick to the subject of rights as it applies to the acquisition of food.
If vegans really believe that animals have rights to the extent that
those rights are violated by farming them for food, then why are those
rights not violated by farming that kills animals collaterally, both
deliberately and incidentally? The latter group is unquestionably much
greater in number. Simply put, why is it a violation of the rights of
the steer to raise and kill him for food, but it is not a violation of
the rights of the mouse or the bird to be chopped up or poisoned in the
process of farming wheat or carrots?

The theory that vegans believe that animals have rights is proven to be
inconsistent.
From: Rupert on
On Jul 11, 3:31 pm, Dutch <n...(a)email.com> wrote:
> Rupert wrote:
> > Gosh, it's quiet in here.
>
> > I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
> > inconsistent.
>
> > (1) For each moral agent M, if M believes that a set of individuals S
> > has a moral right against a set of moral
> > agents T that the agents in T not act in a certain way, and if M can
> > avoid being financially complicit in the
> > set of agents T acting in that way, or in any other comparable moral
> > wrong, while accepting a burden no greater
> > than that incurred by a typical citizen of an affluent nation by
> > becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
> > electricity, and M is knowingly financially complicit in the set of
> > agents T acting in that way, then M is a moral
> > bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite.
>
> Comparing war with farming is an attempt to cloud the issue. The rights
> people normally hold *are* subverted in a wartime situation. By all the
> usually acceptable codes of conduct war violates the rights of everybody
> involved.
>
> Stick to the subject of rights as it applies to the acquisition of food.
> If vegans really believe that animals have rights to the extent that
> those rights are violated by farming them for food, then why are those
> rights not violated by farming that kills animals collaterally, both
> deliberately and incidentally? The latter group is unquestionably much
> greater in number. Simply put, why is it a violation of the rights of
> the steer to raise and kill him for food, but it is not a violation of
> the rights of the mouse or the bird to be chopped up or poisoned in the
> process of farming wheat or carrots?
>
> The theory that vegans believe that animals have rights is proven to be
> inconsistent.

Be specific. Which premise is wrong? It is possible for rights to be
violated during wartime, is it not, and it is possible for Ball to
avoid being financially complicit in the rights violations that are
going on at the moment, is it not? The bottom line is it is a valid
argument in first-order logic and if Ball is going to dispute the
conclusion he has an intellectual obligation to say on request which
premise he has doubts about.

If Ball is going to talk about assfelching and my obligation to leave
my girlfriend and go back to Australia then I'll talk about any topic
I damn well please.

With regard to your other comments, yes, your question is a perfectly
reasonable one and someone who identifies as an animal rights advocate
has an obligation to say something about it, and I plan to work on
that when I get the time. However, I'm not sure you couldn't raise
similar problems regarding every possible position about how we should
treat nonhuman animals, with the possible exception of the two
extremes, a position saying there are no constraints whatsoever on
what we may do to nonhuman animals, and a position saying, yes,
actually, all nonhuman animals with nervous systems have an absolute
right to life and liberty, and we've got an obligation to respect it
come what may, we must reform plant-based agriculture, electricity
production, and pest control, and if civilisation is no longer
sustainable then so be it. Those are the two extremes and they perhaps
both have a consistency about them, but I'm not sure that anyone has
constructed a position anywhere in between that doesn't have some
consistency problems. If you think that you or someone else has, I'm
happy to listen to you expound it if you have an inclination to do
so.

Since I don't see any reason why discrimination on the basis of
species is justifiable, I have a problem. I don't see why accepting
discrimination on the basis of species for pragmatic reasons is a good
way to solve a consistency problem. I am unclear about the advantages
which your position enjoys over mine.
From: Dutch on
"Rupert" <rupertmccallum(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:9c636e09-846f-4b5c-9b86-c04ef581410f(a)x35g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
> On Jul 11, 3:31 pm, Dutch <n...(a)email.com> wrote:
>> Rupert wrote:
>> > Gosh, it's quiet in here.
>>
>> > I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
>> > inconsistent.
>>
>> > (1) For each moral agent M, if M believes that a set of individuals S
>> > has a moral right against a set of moral
>> > agents T that the agents in T not act in a certain way, and if M can
>> > avoid being financially complicit in the
>> > set of agents T acting in that way, or in any other comparable moral
>> > wrong, while accepting a burden no greater
>> > than that incurred by a typical citizen of an affluent nation by
>> > becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
>> > electricity, and M is knowingly financially complicit in the set of
>> > agents T acting in that way, then M is a moral
>> > bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite.
>>
>> Comparing war with farming is an attempt to cloud the issue. The rights
>> people normally hold *are* subverted in a wartime situation. By all the
>> usually acceptable codes of conduct war violates the rights of everybody
>> involved.
>>
>> Stick to the subject of rights as it applies to the acquisition of food.
>> If vegans really believe that animals have rights to the extent that
>> those rights are violated by farming them for food, then why are those
>> rights not violated by farming that kills animals collaterally, both
>> deliberately and incidentally? The latter group is unquestionably much
>> greater in number. Simply put, why is it a violation of the rights of
>> the steer to raise and kill him for food, but it is not a violation of
>> the rights of the mouse or the bird to be chopped up or poisoned in the
>> process of farming wheat or carrots?
>>
>> The theory that vegans believe that animals have rights is proven to be
>> inconsistent.
>
> Be specific. Which premise is wrong?

Just what I said, the theory that vegans believe that animals have rights.
They don't, it's impossible.

It is possible for rights to be
> violated during wartime, is it not, and it is possible for Ball

I'm not interested in becoming a 3rd party in any disputes, which is why I
snipped that part of your original post.

> With regard to your other comments, yes, your question is a perfectly
> reasonable one and someone who identifies as an animal rights advocate
> has an obligation to say something about it, and I plan to work on
> that when I get the time.

Fine.

> However, I'm not sure you couldn't raise
> similar problems regarding every possible position about how we should
> treat nonhuman animals, with the possible exception of the two
> extremes, a position saying there are no constraints whatsoever on
> what we may do to nonhuman animals, and a position saying, yes,
> actually, all nonhuman animals with nervous systems have an absolute
> right to life and liberty, and we've got an obligation to respect it
> come what may, we must reform plant-based agriculture, electricity
> production, and pest control, and if civilisation is no longer
> sustainable then so be it. Those are the two extremes and they perhaps
> both have a consistency about them, but I'm not sure that anyone has
> constructed a position anywhere in between that doesn't have some
> consistency problems. If you think that you or someone else has, I'm
> happy to listen to you expound it if you have an inclination to do
> so.

There's only a "consistency problem" if you claim to believe in some
overarching principle that you don't and/or can't follow through on.

> Since I don't see any reason why discrimination on the basis of
> species is justifiable, I have a problem.

Yes, I know, you have painted yourself into a corner. But it's not a problem
for you, you gain more from it than you lose. By being in this corner you
see yourself as a warrior in this lofty existential moral conundrum. That
suits you.

> I don't see why accepting
> discrimination on the basis of species for pragmatic reasons is a good
> way to solve a consistency problem. I am unclear about the advantages
> which your position enjoys over mine.

I accept that we are all just animals, and that "rights" are nothing more
than a way of perceiving a set of social conventions which evolved through
human history. "Discrimination" is one of most misunderstood and misused
words in the english language. Discrimination is good. Specifically,
failure to discriminate on the basis of species is a form of mental
aberration. People who do this seem to have transcended physical reality and
have taken to living in the realm of pure concepts.





From: Rupert on
On Jul 12, 3:26 pm, "Dutch" <n...(a)email.com> wrote:
> "Rupert" <rupertmccal...(a)yahoo.com> wrote in message
>
> news:9c636e09-846f-4b5c-9b86-c04ef581410f(a)x35g2000hsb.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
> > On Jul 11, 3:31 pm, Dutch <n...(a)email.com> wrote:
> >> Rupert wrote:
> >> > Gosh, it's quiet in here.
>
> >> > I have recently constructed a formal theory T and proven it to be
> >> > inconsistent.
>
> >> > (1) For each moral agent M, if M believes that a set of individuals S
> >> > has a moral right against a set of moral
> >> > agents T that the agents in T not act in a certain way, and if M can
> >> > avoid being financially complicit in the
> >> > set of agents T acting in that way, or in any other comparable moral
> >> > wrong, while accepting a burden no greater
> >> > than that incurred by a typical citizen of an affluent nation by
> >> > becoming fully self-sufficient in food and
> >> > electricity, and M is knowingly financially complicit in the set of
> >> > agents T acting in that way, then M is a moral
> >> > bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite.
>
> >> Comparing war with farming is an attempt to cloud the issue. The rights
> >> people normally hold *are* subverted in a wartime situation. By all the
> >> usually acceptable codes of conduct war violates the rights of everybody
> >> involved.
>
> >> Stick to the subject of rights as it applies to the acquisition of food.
> >> If vegans really believe that animals have rights to the extent that
> >> those rights are violated by farming them for food, then why are those
> >> rights not violated by farming that kills animals collaterally, both
> >> deliberately and incidentally? The latter group is unquestionably much
> >> greater in number. Simply put, why is it a violation of the rights of
> >> the steer to raise and kill him for food, but it is not a violation of
> >> the rights of the mouse or the bird to be chopped up or poisoned in the
> >> process of farming wheat or carrots?
>
> >> The theory that vegans believe that animals have rights is proven to be
> >> inconsistent.
>
> > Be specific. Which premise is wrong?
>
> Just what I said, the theory that vegans believe that animals have rights.
> They don't, it's impossible.
>

We're talking about the argument that Jonathan Ball is a moral
bankrupt and a filthy shitstained hypocrite. There was no premise that
nonhuman animals have rights. And if you tell me that's off-topic for
this newsgroup, I'll just roll around on the ground laughing. When was
the last time this newsgroup was on-topic? If Jonathan Ball spends
years hurling abuse at others for failing to live up to certain
standards of ethical integrity it's reasonable to investigate whether
he himself adheres to those standards.

The statement "nonhuman animals have rights" simply means that there
are some constraints on what we may do to them, which just about
everyone believes. Ethical vegans take an extreme stance on how strong
their rights are. You can raise questions about its consistency, yes,
but you've really given no reason why your position has any particular
advantage over theirs.

> It is possible for rights to be
>
> > violated during wartime, is it not, and it is possible for Ball
>
> I'm not interested in becoming a 3rd party in any disputes, which is why I
> snipped that part of your original post.
>

No probs.

> > With regard to your other comments, yes, your question is a perfectly
> > reasonable one and someone who identifies as an animal rights advocate
> > has an obligation to say something about it, and I plan to work on
> > that when I get the time.
>
> Fine.
>
> > However, I'm not sure you couldn't raise
> > similar problems regarding every possible position about how we should
> > treat nonhuman animals, with the possible exception of the two
> > extremes, a position saying there are no constraints whatsoever on
> > what we may do to nonhuman animals, and a position saying, yes,
> > actually, all nonhuman animals with nervous systems have an absolute
> > right to life and liberty, and we've got an obligation to respect it
> > come what may, we must reform plant-based agriculture, electricity
> > production, and pest control, and if civilisation is no longer
> > sustainable then so be it. Those are the two extremes and they perhaps
> > both have a consistency about them, but I'm not sure that anyone has
> > constructed a position anywhere in between that doesn't have some
> > consistency problems. If you think that you or someone else has, I'm
> > happy to listen to you expound it if you have an inclination to do
> > so.
>
> There's only a "consistency problem" if you claim to believe in some
> overarching principle that you don't and/or can't follow through on.
>

Which I don't, but Jonathan Ball does...

> > Since I don't see any reason why discrimination on the basis of
> > species is justifiable, I have a problem.
>
> Yes, I know, you have painted yourself into a corner. But it's not a problem
> for you, you gain more from it than you lose. By being in this corner you
> see yourself as a warrior in this lofty existential moral conundrum. That
> suits you.
>

It's everyone's problem, not just my own. Simply saying
"discrimination on the basis of species is justified" as a way of
getting on with life is not a solution. If I have a problem because my
position lacks a coherent foundation, you have that problem just as
much. If it counts as a problem, then it's everyone's problem.

And with regard to this idea of yours that it "suits me" to see myself
as a warrior in a lofty existential moral conundrum, you're an idiot
and you really should stick to just talking about ethics. It's called
living a reflective ethical life. Any reasonably reflective person
will acknowledge that there are some difficult moral questions, some
of us decide to actually spend some time thinking them through, and if
that's not your thing, then what are you doing on this newsgroup?

You really do not have the insight into my psyche that you think you
do, you know.


> > I don't see why accepting
> > discrimination on the basis of species for pragmatic reasons is a good
> > way to solve a consistency problem. I am unclear about the advantages
> > which your position enjoys over mine.
>
> I accept that we are all just animals, and that "rights" are nothing more
> than a way of perceiving a set of social conventions which evolved through
> human history. "Discrimination" is one of most misunderstood and misused
> words in the english language. Discrimination is good. Specifically,
> failure to discriminate on the basis of species is a form of mental
> aberration.

That's an utterly ridiculous statement, totally unargued. You've given
up trying to make serious contributions to the debate. You should just
stick to trying to persuade Ronny Hamilton to find something else to
do with his time.

> People who do this seem to have transcended physical reality and
> have taken to living in the realm of pure concepts.